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Abstract
This article examines whether the European Union (EU) already had legal
personality prior to the EU’s Constitutional Convention’s statement in the
autumn of 2002 on the need to provide the EU with legal personality.
Abolition of the distinction between the Union and the two surviving
Communities is an essential aspect of simplifying the Treaties, and making the
European constitutional order easier to understand for those subject to it. It
follows that there has to be a single Union legal personality; but recognition of
this would not, in itself, entail any extension of the Union’s powers. However,
one wonders whether, by giving the conferment of legal personality such a
prominent place in the EU Constitutional Treaty, the draftsman may regard
Lecturer in Law, Queen Mary, University of London, (Centre for Commercial Law Studies,
UK); Formerly, Visiting Researcher at Harvard Law School (European Law Research Center)
and Fellow at the Real Colegio Complutense (Harvard University); Emile Noel Fellow 20042005 at New York University School of Law (Jean Monnet Center for International and
Regional Economic Law and Justice); Visiting Scholar during the fall of 2003 at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School (Institute for Legal Studies). Ph.D. candidate,
LL.M. (European University Institute, Florence, Italy); J.S.M. (Stanford Law School); LL.M.
(Columbia Law School); M.Phil. (London School of Economics and Political Science); B.A.,
J.D. (Granada University, Spain). The author has formerly served in various capacities at: the
World Trade Organization Secretariat (legal affairs division); The United States Court of
International Trade (Chambers of Judge Pogue); European Court of Justice of the European
Communities (Chambers of Advocate General Kokott); Court of First Instance of the
European Communities (Chambers of Judge Lindh); Delegation of the European Commission
to the United Nations; United Nations Secretariat (economic and social council); European
Commission Secretariat-General (forward studies unit); Council of Ministers of the European
Union (legal service’s external relations team); European Parliament Secretariat (DirectorateGeneral for research). The author has previously taught at the National Law School of India
University (Bangalore, India), where he was POROS Chair in European Union law, and the
Law School of the Universidade Federal Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte, Brazil). The author is
most grateful to Professors Angel Sainz-Badillos and David Kennedy for their generosity in
providing him with excellent means for work while he was at the Real Colegio Complutense
of Harvard University.

1

EU Legal Personality

Rafael Leal-Arcas

this as more than the purely technical matter, which it ought to be. Efforts go
back to 1996, with a study presented in the form of a draft treaty for the
European Parliament, and coordinated by scientists at the Robert Schuman
Centre of the European University Institute in Florence: “A Unified and
Simplified Model of the European Communities Treaties and the Treaty on
European Union in Just One Treaty.” However, simplification of the treaties
today means more than having just one treaty. Following a merger of legal
personalities and of Treaties, if necessary, it would be anachronistic to retain
the current pillar structure of the EU. Doing away with this pillar structure
would help to simplify the architecture of the Union considerably.
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I. Introduction

The purpose of this article is to discuss whether or not the European Union
(EU) already had legal personality prior to the EU’s Constitutional
Convention’s statement in the autumn of 2002 on the need to provide the EU
with legal personality.1 By legal personality, we understand the capacity to
1

This is a very debatable issue among scholars and practitioners. Some authors argue that the
EU does have legal personality through Article 24 TEU. Among the many authors who have
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enter into contractual and other relations with third States, and to bear full
responsibility for one’s actions. In this respect, two disclaimers need to be put
forward: First, I will analyze this issue mainly from the angle of foreign
policy, and not trade policy, since in the case of external trade policy, it is the
European Community (EC),2 and not the EU, that concludes international
trade agreements; Second, throughout this article, terms such as European
Union and European Community appear continuously. It is important to
clarify the difference between them, which is presented in Part II.

studied this issue are Tizzano, A. "La Personnalité Internationale de l'Union Européenne,"
REVUE DU MARCHE UNIQUE EUROPEEN, Paris, No. 4, 1998, pp. 11-40; Sommet
d'Amsterdam: conclusion de la CIG, LETTRE MENSUELLE SOCIO-ECONOMIQUE,
Bruxelles, No. 27, September 1997, pp. 16-27; Remiro Brotons, A. "Consideraciones sobre la
Conferencia Intergubernamental de 1996," GACETA JURÍDICA DE LA CE, Boletín,
Madrid, No. 110, February 1996, pp. 7-18; Pechstein, M. "Une personnalité internationale
pour l'Union Européenne?," REVUE DES AFFAIRES EUROPEENNES, Paris, Année 6, No.
3, December 1996, pp. 229-233; Vilariño Pintos, E. "Representación exterior y cooperación
diplomática y consular en el Tratado de la Unión Europea," REVISTA DE INSTITUCIONES
EUROPEAS, Madrid, Vol. 22, No. 2, Enero-Abril 1995, pp. 417-443; De Gucht, K. "The
common foreign and security policy (CFSP): is there room for new perspectives in the
aftermath of Maastricht?," STUDIA DIPLOMATICA, Bruxelles, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1997, pp.
49-83.
2
The most important of three European Communities, the European Community was
originally founded on March 25, 1957 by the signing of the Treaty of Rome under the name of
European Economic Community. The 'Economic' was removed from its name by the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which at the same time effectively made the European Community
the first of three pillars of the European Union, called the Community (or Communities)
pillar.
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With two remaining Communities3 (currently there are only two
Communities,4 since the European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC] Treaty
expired on July 23, 2002),5 one Union, and three different pillars6 of
3

In the 1950s, six European countries decided to pool their economic resources and set up a
system of joint decision-making on economic issues. To do so, they formed three
organizations. European Communities is the name given collectively to these three
organizations, i.e., the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic
Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), when in 1967,
they were first merged under a single institutional framework with the Merger Treaty. They
formed the basis of what is today the European Union.
The EEC soon became the most important of these three communities, and was
eventually renamed simply the European Community, subsequent treaties adding it further
areas of competence that extended beyond the purely economic areas. The other two
communities remained extremely limited: for that reason, often little distinction is made
between the European Community and the European Communities as a whole. Furthermore,
in 2002 the ECSC ceased to exist with the expiration of the Treaty of Paris which established
it. Seen as redundant, no effort was made to retain it — its assets and liabilities were
transferred to the EC, and coal and steel became subject to the EC Treaty.
With respect to trade, it should also be said that the WTO Agreement was concluded
by the European Communities and not by the European Community. It was thought that, to
the extent the Uruguay Round Agreements concerned matters falling within the scope of the
ECSC or the Euratom Treaty, these agreements fell outside the competence of the European
Community.
4
In fact, the two remaining Communities work as one entity which functions in the
framework of two Treaties, even if they are legally different. In this sense, legally binding
agreements concluded by the EC are still signed on behalf of one or both of the existing
Communities. It must be said clearly that the EC, and not the EU, is a member of the World
Trade Organization or regional fisheries organizations, to give just two examples. In this
respect, see Sack, J. “The European Community’s Membership of International
Organizations”, Common Market Law Review, 32, 1995, pp. 1227-1256.
5
See the decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the EU Member States,
meeting within the Council, on 27 February 2002 on the financial consequences of the expiry
of the ECSC Treaty and on the research fund for coal and steel at 2002/234/ECSC, Official
Journal of the European Communities L 79, Vol. 45, 22 March 2002, in
(last
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_079/l_07920020322en00420059.pdf
visited June 17, 2005). Also see, http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/misc/74346.pdf, p. 2.
6
Later on in this article, I will elaborate on what Torrent calls the "fourth pillar" of the EU.
The pillar illustration has become widely known as metaphorically being part of a Greek
temple, symbolising the EU's institutional structure. This Hellenic architectural illustration is a
creation of Sir Geoffrey Howe, former UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs. The European Union takes decisions in three separate domains (policy areas), also
known as the three pillars of the EU:
1. The first pillar is the 'Community domain,' covering most of the common policies,
where decisions are taken by the so-called 'Community method' – involving the
Commission, Parliament and the Council-; The Community method is the EU's usual
method of decision-making, in which the Commission makes a proposal to the
Council and Parliament who then debate it, propose amendments and eventually
adopt it as EU law. In the process, they will often consult other bodies such as the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.

4

EU Legal Personality

Rafael Leal-Arcas

competences7 and decision-making, it is no wonder that third parties are often
puzzled.8 In order to avoid this chaos, it was proposed at the Amsterdam
Intergovernmental Conference of 1996-1997 to create a single legal entity, the
European Union,9 just like the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade

2.
3.

The second pillar is the common foreign and security policy, where decisions are
taken by the Council alone; and
The third pillar is 'police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,' where – once
again – the Council takes the decisions.

Within the first pillar, the Council normally takes decisions by qualified majority
vote. In the other pillars, the Council decision has to be unanimous; it can therefore be
blocked by the veto of any one country. If the Council so decides, it can use the so-called
'Community bridge' to transfer certain matters from the third to the first pillar. This procedure
for transferring certain matters from the third pillar of the EU to the first pillar is done so that
they can be dealt with using the Community method. Any decision to use the bridge has to be
taken by the Council, unanimously, and then ratified by each Member State.
7
The term “competence” appears very often throughout this paper. It originates from the
French term competence to refer to the authority or power to do or develop something. Thus,
EC competence, as opposed to national competence, is the authority conferred on the EC, as
opposed to a national government, to be in charge of a certain policy or issue.
8
For a comprehensive study on the ramifications of the expiration of the ECSC, see
Ubertazzi, B. “The End of the ECSC,” European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 8 (2004) N°
20, at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-020a.htm (last visited February 15, 2006), as well as
Groenendijk N. and Hospers G.J., A requiem for the European Coal and Steel Community, in
De Economist 2002, 601-612. Also, Meunier P., La Communauté européenne du charbon et
de l’acier est morte, vive la fédération européenne, in Revue du Marché commun et de
l’Union européenne 2001, 509-515 ; Obwexer W., «Das Ende der Europäischen Gemeinschaft
für Kohle und Stahl», in Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2002, 517-524; Vallterra
M.C., «La disolución de la Comunidad Europea del carbón y del acero: estado actual», in
Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 2002, 393-432.
9
The European Union or EU is an intergovernmental and supranational union of 25 European
countries, known as EU Member States. The European Union was established under that name
in 1992 by the Treaty on European Union (the Mastricht Treaty). The European Union's
activities cover all areas of public policy, from health and economic policy to foreign policy
and defence. However, the extent of its powers differs greatly between areas. Depending on
the area in question, the EU may therefore resemble:
1. a federation (for example, on monetary affairs, agricultural, trade and environmental
policy);
2. a confederation (for example, in social and economic policy, consumer protection,
home affairs); or
3. an international organization (for example, in foreign policy).
Since the Treaty on European Union came into force (Maastricht Treaty or TEU) on the
1st of November 1993, the use of the expression "European Union" has been generalized. At
the same time, among the experts, the use of "pillars of the European Union" is very much a la
mode. These two phenomena are to be regretted since they tend to create confusion (with an
indiscriminate use of the expression "European Union") or they tend to introduce a kind of
false compartmentalization (i.e., division of competences in the EU by pillars) on the
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Organization (WTO).10 This proposal was perceived as a possible transfer of
sovereignty in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Unfortunately, this discussion focused on the question of the exercise of
competence, and the idea of the EU as a single actor (legal person) does not
prejudge the powers of the EU in, say, the common foreign and security
policy.
Instead of being faced with two international organizations (the
remaining two Communities), and the EU as an umbrella concept for these
organizations as well as the second and third pillars, third States are now
facing two organizations (the Communities) and a third legal (?) person (the
EU), which appears as a different entity from the Communities. This situation
hardly corresponds to the basic institutional principles of the TEU, such as
Article 1.3 TEU11 or Article 3.2 TEU.12 From this, we can deduce that there is

institutional reality to which these expressions make reference. The reasons which motivate
this regret are mainly political: the fact of knowing who does what, and therefore who is
responsible for certain issues, constitutes the conditio sine qua non, on one hand, for policymakers to master the nature of their decisions and, on the other hand, for a minimum of
democratic control to be possible.
10
Since the creation of the ECSC and the adoption of the Euratom and EEC Treaties, efforts
have been made to join the then three European Communities: the Treaty of Rome, which
established certain institutions common to all three Communities (such as the Court of Justice,
or the Parliamentary Assembly); the Treaty of Brussels of April 8, 1975, which joined the then
three Communities’ executive powers in one Commission and administration; or, most
recently, the fusion of the treaties of the EU into the EU Constitutional Treaty, granting
thereby legal personality to the EU. The Union will therefore be able to represent both the EU
and its Member States, conclude international agreements, and become a member of
international organizations beyond the case of the WTO or FAO. In other words, the EU will
finally be able to take action and assume responsibility on behalf of its Member States.
11
Article 1.3 TEU predicates that “The Union shall be founded on the European
Communities”.
12
Article 3.2 TEU reads that “The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its
external activities as a whole”.
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a need for clarification and for more coherence to the institutional image of the
EU in the outside world.13
The genesis and raison d’etre of this article is because I have noticed
that lawyers, academics, and international civil servants alike often times
confuse the terms European Community (EC) and European Union (EU),
especially when it comes to international relations and international law. I start
my analysis with a legal distinction between the EC and the EU, focusing on
foreign policy more generally first, and then on external economic policy. To
conclude whether the EU has legal personality, I then test arguments for and

13

There is a vast body of literature on this matter, especially the work of the European
Convention on the future of Europe, Working Group III on the EU’s legal personality, guided
by Professor Amato. Other literature, Rama Montaldo M., International Legal Personality and
Implied Powers of International Organizations, in BYIL 1970, 111; What follows is a nonexhaustive indication of readings I have come across in the field of EC external trade
relations: Allen, J.J., The European Common Market and the GATT, The University Press of
Washington, D. C., 1960; Bekemans, L. & Tsoukalis, L. (eds.) Europe and Global Economic
Interdependence, College of Europe and European University Press, 1993; Bourgeois, J.H.J.
“The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an Echternach Procession”, Common
Market Law Review 32, 1995, pp. 763-787; Dashwood, A. “External Relations Provisions of
the Amsterdam Treaty,” Common Market Law Review 35, 1998, pp. 1019-1045; Da FonsecaWollheim, H. & Krenzler, H. “Die Reichweite der gemainsamen Handelspolitik nach dem
Vertrag von Amsterdam- eine Debatte ohne Ende”, Europarecht 1998, pp. 223 ff.; Demaret,
P. Relations extérieures de la Communauté européenne et marché intérieur: aspects
juridiques et fonctionnels, Story-Scientia, 1986; Heidensohn, K. Europe and World Trade,
Pinter, 1995; Henig, S. External Relations of the European Community. Associations and
Trade Agreements, Chatham House: PEP, 1971; Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations
Economiques
Exterieures
dans
l'Union
Europeenne,
in
http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998; Pescatore, P. “Opinion 1/94 on
“Conclusion” of the WTO Agreement: is there an Escape from a programmed Disaster?”,
Common Market Law Review 36, 1999, pp. 387-405; Petersmann, E.-U. “Application of
GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, Common Market Law Review
20, 1983, pp. 397-437; Piris, J.-C. “La Capacité de l’Union Europeenne de s’engager et d’agir
en Matiere de Relations Economiques Exterieures: l’example de l’OMC”, Florence, Academy
of European Law, Coference given by Jean-Claude Piris, Jurisconsult of the Council of the
European Union, on the 15th July 1998; Völker, E.L.M. Barriers to External and Internal
Community Trade, Kluwer, 1993; Völker, E.L.M., (ed.) Protectionism and the European
Community, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1987; Woolcock, S. Market Access Issues
in EC-US Relations. Trading Partners or Trading Blows?, Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1991.
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against the existence of the EU’s legal personality by analyzing Article 24 of
the Treaty on European Union.

II. A Comparison between the European Union and the European
Community

A.- A General Overview

Most people wrongly believe that the EC has been replaced by the EU. This is
inaccurate since both entities co-exist. The main difference between the two is
that, technically speaking, only the EC has legal personality and, therefore, as
we will see later, can conclude international agreements, buy or sell property,
sue and be sued in court.14 All these are competences which the EC has, but
the EU does not. The EU comprises the EC and its Member States. The
European Union is the political and institutional framework in which the EC's
and certain Member States' competences are exercised. In the case of Member
States, the competences within the institutional framework of the EU are the

14

On the implications of international legal personality, see Arangio-Ruiz G., Diritto
internazionale e personalità giuridica, Clueb, Bologna, 1971, 255; Pescatore P., Les relations
extérieures des Communautés européennes. Contribution à la doctrine de la personnalité des
organisations internationales, in 103 RC 1961, II, 137; Rama Montaldo M., International
Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations, in BYIL 1970, 111;
Seyersted F., ‘International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations. Do their Capacity
really depend upon their Constitutions?,’ in Indian Journal of International Law 1964, 39;
Seyersted F., Is the International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations valid vis-avis non members?, Indian Journal of International Law 1964, 260. See also Granvik, L.
“Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of
Bindingness” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union,
Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 255.
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second and third pillars (Common Foreign and Security Policy, and police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, respectively) of the EU. The EU,
established by the Treaty15 on European Union (TEU) [also known as the
Treaty of Maastricht],16 now has 25 Member States17 and a complex structure,

15

Treaties are usually composed of articles, Protocols and Declarations. As an example we
have the Treaty of Amsterdam, composed of 15 articles, 13 Protocols and 58 Declarations. In
the case of the EU, there are currently founding treaties, amending treaties, accession treaties
and budgetary treaties. There is also an EU Constitutional Treaty, which seeks to consolidate,
simplify and replace the existing set of overlapping treaties. It was signed in Rome on October
29, 2004 and is due to come into force in the near future, conditional on its ratification by all
EU Member States. In the meantime, or if the EU Constitutional Treaty fails to be ratified by
all EU Member States, the EU will continue to work on the basis of the current treaties. As for
the founding treaties, there are four of them: the Treaty of Paris (1952), establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which expired in July 2002; the Treaty
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom); the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community (EEC); [these last two treaties are known as the Treaties of
Rome (1958). However, when the term "Treaty of Rome" or the acronym "TEC" are used, it is
to mean only the EEC Treaty]; and the Treaty on European Union (1993) [this Treaty changed
the name of the European Economic Community to simply "the European Community" and
introduced new intergovermental structures to deal with the aspects of common foreign and
security policy, as well as police and judicial cooperation. The structure formed by these socalled Three Pillars (Community pillar; foreign and security policy; police and judicial
cooperation) is the European Union, whose scope then became more overtly political as well
as economic]. With respect to the amending treaties, there are also four of them, which are:
the Merger Treaty (1967), which provided for a Single Commisison and a Single Council of
the then three European Communities; the Single European Act (1987), which provided for
the adoptions required for the achievement of the Internal Market; the Treaty of Amsterdam
(signed in 1997), whose purpose was, inter alia, to simplify decision making in addition to
further integrating the common foreign and security policy concept. It also amended and
renumbered the EU and EC Treaties; and the Treaty of Nice (signed in 2001), where qualfied
majority voting was again extended to more areas, abolishing the national right to veto in
some policy areas. A concept of "enhanced co-operation" was introduced for countries
wishing to forge closer links in areas where other EU Member States disagreed. The accession
treaties came into being for every enlargement of the EU. As for budgetary treaties, there have
been two: the Budgetary Treaty of 1970, which gave the European Parliament the last word on
what is known as "non-compulsory expenditure;" and the Budgetary Treaty of 1975, which
gave the European Parliament the power to reject the budget as a whole, and created the
European Court of Auditors.
16
OJ C 191, July 29, 19992. The Treaty of Maastricht, establishing the European Union,
transformed the European Economic Community into the European Community (Article G),
including the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy
Community. This required complex planning in order to take into account the specifics of the
three founding treaties, and especially to make the EC the first of the three pillars of the EU.
17
The six founding countries of the EU are France, (West) Germany, Belgium, The
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy. The UK, Ireland and Denmark joined in 1973. Greece
joined in 1981, whereas Spain and Portugal in 1986. East Germany reunited with West
Germany in 1990 and consequently became part of the EU. Austria, Sweden and Finland

9

EU Legal Personality

Rafael Leal-Arcas

including both integrationist and intergovernmental elements, known as
“pillars.” According to the TEU, the Union is founded on the European
Communities (Article 1) and is served by a single institutional framework
(Article 3). However, there are important legal differences between the
European Communities and the EU (of which the Communities form a part,
called the first pillar).18
As we will see later, the institutional system of the EU is perceived in a
confusing way, not only by the citizens of the Union but also by those who
direct the Union, those politically responsible for it, and by the civil servants
of the European Institutions. Thus, we must approach the institutional system
of the EU with a double perspective: a legal side and a political side. A legal
side, because one cannot direct or guide a system without knowing the rules of
the game; a political side, because one must know the reasons for the
malfunctioning of a system.
Furthermore, Ambassador Hugo Paemen19 accepts the importance of
making a terminological distinction between the EC and the EU when dealing
with external relations. I cite him literally:

joined in 1995. The last group of countries that joined the EU are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus, which joined in
2004. More countries are expected to join in the near future: Bulgaria and Romania in 2007,
and Turkey is an official candidate to join the EU.
18
See Kennedy, T. Learning European Law. A Primer and Vade-mecum, Sweet and Maxwell,
1998, pp. 49 et seq.
19
Former Head of the European Commission Delegation to the United States.
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“I should make a clear distinction between the terms
‘European Community’ (or EC) and ‘European Union.’
After all, until the Treaty of Amsterdam comes into force,
only the European Community will grant it legal
personality. Therefore, please forgive me if occasionally I
use the terms European Union where it is not correct: We
went through a very painful adjustment period to go from
the European Community to European Union, so it is
20

somewhat difficult now to make the distinction.”

In relation to the potential legal personality of the European Union visà-vis the European Community, it can be stated that European Community
law, as well as the European Community, still exists alongside the European
Union. So far, according to Article 281 EC,21 the Community has legal
personality. Under international law, international organizations can have
international personality, that is, rights and duties under the public
international system of law.22 In this respect, the major international law
precedent on the international personality of public international law
institutions is the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the
Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations case.23
20

See Paemen, H. “The European Union in International Affairs: Recent Developments,”
Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 22, 1999, p. 136.
21
Article 281 EC reads: The Community shall have legal personality.
22
See Schermers, H.G. & Blokker, N. M., International Institutional Law: Unity within
Diversity, 3rd edn, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1995, pp. 976-82; White, N. The Law of International
Organisations, Manchester University Press, 1996.
23
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174.
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Since the EC is an international organization, it can explicitly be given legal
personality by a treaty which has created it. Concerning third States, what
counts is the international practice of the organization and the links that such
an organization creates with these third States. This practice and its links will
(or will not) create the organization’s international legal personality.
In September 1948, Count Bernadotte was the Chief United Nations
Truce Negotiator in Jerusalem. He was killed by a gang of private terrorists.
The United Nations General Assembly asked for an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice to bring an international claim concerning
injuries suffered by its employees in circumstances involving the
responsibility of a State.24 Although the UN Charter does not expressly confer
legal personality on the United Nations Organization, the Court examined the
Charter as a whole and concluded that the UN was an international entity
holding international rights and obligations, and capable of maintaining its
rights by bringing international claims. The Court pronounced itself as
follows:

Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the
Organisation is an international person. That is not the same as
saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal
personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a
State…Whereas a State possesses the totality of international
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rights and duties recognised by international law, the rights and
duties of an entity such as the Organisation must depend upon
its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its
25

constituent documents and developed in practice.

So the question is: what, then, is the European Union? For the time
being, it is just the institutional and political framework in which all EC's and
certain (and only certain) Member States' competences are exercised. In the
near future, once the EU Constitutional Treaty is implemented –or a similar
legal document, if the EU Constitutional Treaty will never see the light of daythe Union will be more than just a simple framework and, therefore, will
become an actor with its own legal personality and competences. Let me try to
explain this argument by giving the example of former Yugoslavia.
Firstly, if we think of sending military forces, then we are dealing with
the 25 Member States of the Union acting outside the institutional system of
the Union. However, one should not exclude the possibility that sending
troops to former Yugoslavia may have a link with the common foreign and
security policy. The borderline between Member States acting on their own,
outside the institutional framework of the Union, and Member States acting
within the political and institutional framework of the Union, is not very clear.
Secondly, if we refer to the "European Administration" of the town of Mostar,
24

McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at p.
27.
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then we are dealing with Member States' competences in the framework of the
EU. Thirdly, if we look at the commercial regime applicable to the republics
of former Yugoslavia, then we are dealing with the EC's competences.
These examples should illustrate the danger of an indiscriminate use of
the expression “the European Union does...” Such an expression does not let
us know who really does what: what does the EC as such do? What do the 25
Member States together do in the framework of the Union? What do both
Member States and the Community together do? Obviously it would be even
worse to use the expression European Union when making reference to the
Member States outside the EU’s institutional framework. Again, knowing the
precise answer to these questions is vital, since the nature, as well as the legal
and political consequences of this action, is completely different, depending
on who acts.26 To defend this argument, allow me to suggest two examples:
Example 1: "The European Union reacts to the Helms-Burton27 and
d'Amato Acts.28" This statement could mean:
a.- that the Community and the Member States both react to these two
legislations, each with their own legal and political means; or
b.- that Member States cede their responsibilities to appear behind a
single action conducted by the Community. As a matter of fact, the
25

Reparations Case: Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations
[1949] ICJ Rep. pp. 179-80.
26
Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans l'Union
Europeenne, http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998, chapter 1, subtitle 1.1.
27
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (better known as the
Helms-Burton Act) is a United States law which strengthens and continues the United States
embargo against Cuba.
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Community has very limited competences regarding such issues as the HelmsBurton or d'Amato Acts. Therefore, its action has very little effect or
repercussion.
Example 2: “Agreements between the European Union and
Mercosur,29 and the European Union and the Andean Community.30”
This expression does not reveal the main difference between both
agreements. The agreement with Mercosur is an agreement signed between the
EC and the Member States on the European side, and Mercosur and its
Member States on the South American side, whereas the agreement with the
Andean Community and its Member States has been signed only by the
European Community on the European side. In other words, EC Member
States have not participated in this second agreement. Therefore, the first
agreement has a greater scope than the second one. The same difference exists
between the Euromediterranean Agreements of the EC and its Member States
with Tunisia,31 Morocco,32 Israel,33 and other countries, as well as the

28

The d'Amato Act refers to the economic embargo by the U.S. government against
companies of third countries investing in gas or oil in Iran and Libya.
29
MERCOSUR stands for Mercado Comun del Sur (Common Market of the Southern Cone)
and is composed of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. On 9 December 2005,
Venezuela was accepted as a new member, but it will be officialized in late 2006. It was
founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, which was later amended and updated by the
1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto. Its purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of
goods, peoples, and currency.
30
The Andean Community is a trade bloc comprising until recently 5 South American
countries: Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. In 2006, Venezuela announced
its withdrawal, reducing the Andean Community to 4 member states. The trade bloc was
called the Andean Pact until 1996, and came into existence with the signing of the Cartagena
Agreement in 1969. Its headquarters are located in Lima, Peru.
31
OJ L 97/1998, p. 1.
32
Council Regulation 2211/78, 1978 O.J. (L 264) 1.
33
Agreement between the European Economic Community and Israel, 1975 O.J. (L 136) 1
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Euromediterranean Agreement with the PLO (Palestinian Liberation
Organization).34 The latter Agreement was signed by only the EC (and not the
EC and its Member States), and has a lesser scope than the former
Agreements, since the EU Member States do not participate in the agreement.
It is thus of vital importance to make certain linguistic clarifications
which will ease the understanding of what we are trying to explain:
a.- the expression “The Union does humanitarian work” actually
means “The Community and/or its Member States, acting together in the
framework of the European Union, do humanitarian work;”
b.- the expression “The Union and its Member States” is rather
confusing since the Union includes the Member States; however, we can speak
of “the Community and its Member States.” Here we mean 26 different legal
entities, each one of them having legal personality;
c.- we can use the expression “The Union and its Member States act
individually;” by this we understand activities carried out within the
framework of the Union (by the Community and/or the Member States acting
together), and activities carried out by the Member States outside the
framework of the Union.

B. - A Note on Foreign Policy

(signed on May 11, 1975, this was a free trade and cooperation agreement).
34
OJ L 187/1997, p. 1.
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The success of the EU on unity in commercial policy seems to be inextricably
linked to its success with a coherent foreign policy. In fact, as is evidenced in
the famous bananas and hormones disputes, both the political and economic
aspects of the EU’s external relations are inseparable. At what was called the
European Summit35 in The Hague in December 1969, the heads of State and
Government of the six original Member States asked their ministers of foreign
affairs to study how progress could best be made in the area of political
unification.

36

Their report was a proposal for cooperation in the area of

foreign policy, which became the basis of what, for 25 years, would be called
European Political Cooperation (EPC).37 The procedure was purely
intergovernmental and based on unanimity, a constraint reflecting a strong
belief that foreign policy decisions remained under the sovereign competence
of national governments.38
John Peterson and Helene Sjursen argue that the move from European
Political Cooperation (EPC) -in retrospect, a strikingly anodyne constructionto the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was propelled by

35

European (or EU) Summits are the meetings of heads of State and government (i.e.,
presidents and/or prime ministers, depending on what their national constitutions indicate) of
all EU countries, plus the President of the European Commission. In today's EU politics,
summits are embodied in the European Council, which meets, in principle, four times a year
to agree upon overall EU policy and to review progress. The European Council is the highestlevel policy-making body in the European Union, which is why its meetings are often called
“summits.”
36
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES IN EUROPE (Walter Carlsnaes & Steve Smith eds., 1994).
37
For a description and analysis of such foreign policy co-ordination, see EUROPEAN
POLITICAL COOPERATION IN THE 1980S: A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR
WESTERN EUROPE? (Alfred Pijpers et al. eds., 1988).
38
L’UNION EUROPEENNE ET LE MONDE APRES AMSTERDAM (Marianne Dony ed.,
1999).
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ambitions to create a “common” EU foreign policy analogous to, say, the
common agricultural policy or common commercial policy.39 Yet, French
national foreign policy decisions to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific, send
troops to Bosnia, or propose a French candidate to head the European Central
Bank could be viewed as far more momentous and consequential than
anything agreed upon within the CFSP between 1995 and 1997. It is plausible
to suggest, as David Allen does, that the EU simply does not have a “foreign
policy”40 in the accepted sense of the term. Going one step further, the CFSP
may be described, perhaps dismissed, as a “myth.”41 It does not, as the
Maastricht Treaty promises, cover “all areas of foreign and security policy.”42
Obviously, it is not always supported “actively and unreservedly by its
Member States in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.”43
That said, and knowing that the presumption in the European Union is
to have collective action, is there really a “common” European interest? If so,
is this interest so great as to assume that in certain circumstances Member
States will act with a single voice? Do Member States have enough proximity
in their national interests to act with one voice in the international sphere?

39

Peterson, J. & Sjursen, H. “Conclusion. The Myth of the CFSP?”, in PETERSON, J. &
SJURSEN, H. (EDS.) A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? COMPETING
VISIONS OF THE CFSP, Routledge, 1998, p. 169.
40
Allen, D, `Who speaks for Europe? The search for an effective and coherent foreign policy'
in Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (eds), A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE?
COMPETING VISIONS OF THE CFSP, London, Routledge, 1998.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.

18

EU Legal Personality

Rafael Leal-Arcas

Following the same authors,44 the European Union has not yet reached
its apogee in terms of its ability to act with power and unity in international
affairs. However, some competences are exclusively of the European
Community. Customs duties and protective non-tariff barriers (NTBs)45 such
as quantitative limits, safety norms, health, and hygiene standards, were and
are fixed by the Union as a whole, not by the individual Member States.
Although the Single European Act in 1987 established a legal basis for
EPC, it remained largely unchanged and intergovernmental. Only when the
EC faced the challenge of Central and Eastern Europe and the Iraqi crisis in
1990 and 1991 was more thought given to increasing cooperation in foreign
policy. The result was the “implementation of a common foreign and security
policy including eventual framing of a common defence policy . . .” (Article B
TEU).46 The fact that Title V of the Treaty on the European Union brought
foreign policy under the umbrella of the EU represents a step forward in
clarity. Having more transparent instruments is the result of requiring Member
States to conform to common positions of the Council of Ministers.47 Through
joint actions, the Member States are committed to acting in support of these
common positions. Finally, provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty give the
CFSP a clearer character by creating a High Representative of EU foreign
44

John Peterson & Helene Sjursen.
NTBs are government measures or policies other than tariffs that restrict or distort
international trade. Examples are import quotas, discriminatory government procurement
practices, technical and scientific barriers related to plant health, environmental labelling,
codes and standards, inter alia.
46
Official Journal C 191 of 29 July 1992.
45
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policy (Title V of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union),
assisted by a new policy planning and early warning unit in the Secretariat of
the EU Council.48
At Maastricht, it was not possible for Member States to accomplish a
common foreign and security policy in the framework of the traditional
mechanisms of Community institutions and Community law.49 The second
pillar50 of the EU does not presently provide for a real supranational decisionmaking by majority voting. It utilizes unanimity as a decision-making system
with the possibility of common positions51 (Article 12 of the Treaty on
European Union [TEU])52 and joint actions53 (Article 13 TEU).54
47

A Council common position is the provisional position agreed by the EU Council after the
first reading stage of legislation, that is, after taking account of any amendments proposed or
opinions offered by the European Parliament.
48
Treaty of Amsterdam, declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early
warning unit, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 132.
49
These mechanisms are known in the Community institutions as those of the First Pillar.
50
The so-called “second pillar” refers to the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the EU.
51
The common position in the context of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is
designed to make cooperation more systematic and improve its coordination. The EU Member
States are required to comply with and uphold such positions which have been adopted
unanimously at the Council.
For reasons of simplification, the EU Constitutional Treaty which is in the process of
being ratified restricts CFSP instruments to European decisions and international agreements.
Once the EU Constitutional Treaty enters into force, common positions and their
implementation will be based on European decisions (non-legislative instruments) adopted by
the Council of Ministers.
52
Article 12 TEU reads:
The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by:
defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy,
- deciding on common strategies,
- adopting joint actions,
- adopting common positions,
- strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.
53
Joint action, which is a legal instrument under Title V of the Treaty on European Union
(common foreign and security policy, CFSP), means coordinated action by the EU Member
States whereby all kinds of resources (human resources, know-how, financing, equipment, et
cetera) are mobilized in order to attain specific objectives set by the Council, on the basis of
general guidelines from the European Council.
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It is the Treaty of Amsterdam55 which attempts to strengthen these
mechanisms without implying major changes in this respect.56 A main change
is that the Council of the EU may adopt joint actions or common positions by
qualified majority if they are based on a common strategy decided upon by the
European Council.57 However, in adopting a common strategy, the European
Council58 must be unanimous, which diminishes the practical importance of
this innovation. In addition, any Member State can declare that for “important
and sated qualified reasons of national policy,” it will oppose the adoption of a
decision to be taken by qualified majority, in which case such decision shall
not be taken.

For reasons of simplification, the EU Constitutional Treaty, which is in the process of
being ratified, restricts CFSP instruments to European decisions and international agreements.
Once the EU Constitutional Treaty enters into force, joint actions and the implementation of
such action will therefore be based on European decisions (non-legislative instruments)
adopted by the Council of Ministers.
54
Article 13 TEU reads:
1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the
common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union
in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available
by the Union and the Member States.
3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common
foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European
Council.
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall
implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.
55
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and certain related acts, October 2, 1997, OJ C 340/1 (1997).
56
See Monar, J. “The European Union’s Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty of
Amsterdam: A “Strengthened Capacity for External Action”?”, 2 European Foreign Affairs
Review 1997, pp. 413-436. In this article, on page 434 the author concludes that, for the EU’s
foreign affairs system, the Treaty of Amsterdam “brings only fragments of a reform”.
57
Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in
The Forum for US-EU Legal-Economic Affairs, The Mentor Group, 1998, p. 62.
58
Not to mix with the Council of the EU. The European Council consists of the Heads of State
and Government of the 25 Member States of the European Union.
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Another important change at Amsterdam is that the Secretary-General
of the Council will assist the Presidency of the Council59 in matters dealing
with the common foreign and security policy (Article 18.3 TEU).60 It is still
unknown whether the High Representative for the common foreign and
security policy will bring more coherence to the EU. One wonders how much
coherence can be found in a system in which the Presidency will continue to
assert its own role, the High Representative wishes to play an important role,
and the Commission continues to be the representative of the EC in the first
pillar,61 as well as fully associated with the second pillar and, therefore has its
own voice.
The Amsterdam Treaty also implies that parts of the third pillar62 have
been transferred to the first pillar.63 This means that Community competence
and supranational Community law are growing. The matters transferred from
the third to the first pillar cover the entry of third-country nationals (visas,
asylum, and immigration policy). This shows that, although the transfer of the
59

The Presidency of the Council of the European Union has in broad terms three essential
functions:
1. Organizing and chairing meetings of the Council and its working groups;
2. Representing the Council, both in its work with the other institutions and bodies of
the EU, and internationally, for example in the United Nations and the World Trade
Organization. The Presidency also represents the EU in its relations with countries
outside the Union; and
3. Ensuring that outstanding negotiations from the previous Presidency are taken
forward, and if necessary are handed on to the following Presidency.
The Presidency rotates among the EU Member States every six months.
60
Article 18 (3) TEU reads: The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the
Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and
security policy.
61
This is the so-called Community pillar.
62
The so-called "third pillar" refers to matters of police and judicial cooperation in the EU.
63
The first pillar contains Title IV on “Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies
Related to Free Movement of Persons.”
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second pillar to the first may still seem remote, a gradual merger in one form
or another of the two pillars seems inevitable for the construction of Europe.
The whole purpose of the creation of the CFSP was to enable the EU
Member States to speak with one voice by creating a new entity which would
do this on their behalf.64 The Amsterdam Treaty brought limited majority
voting for implementing foreign policy once it has been agreed to in outline by
unanimity (Title V of the consolidated version of the Treaty of Amsterdam),65
and the definition and implementation of a foreign policy position have been
helped further along by the existence of EC policy instruments, in particular,
the budget. For example, the EC instruments advanced external policy with
respect to the Mediterranean and to the New Transatlantic Agenda66 between
the EU and the U.S., and enhanced cooperation with Asia through the ASEAN
Initiative (Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration,67 of August 8,
1967).68 In addition, the EU’s political relations with Central and Eastern
Europe have been focused through Europe Agreements negotiated under the
EC’s competence.
The EU’s achievements in assisting other nations have been
significant. Under the CFSP in 1995, the EU gave Russia U.S.$ 1.5 billion to
64

Wessel, R. “The Multi-Level Constitution of European Foreign Relations,” EUI Workshop
Paper, April 2002, pp. 1-35, at 22.
65
TEU Title V.
66
The New Transatlantic Agenda, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 6, No. 49, 894-96
(December 4, 1995).
67
ASEAN is composed of 10 members. The six Founding Countries of ASEAN are Malaysia,
Indonesia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei. The rest of countries are
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. The aims and purposes of the Association are to
accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development, and to promote
regional peace and stability.
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assist its transition to democracy. In 1996 European humanitarian aid totaled
almost U.S.$ 2 billion. Because Member States have proved reluctant to
contribute to CFSP action from national budgets, EC financing has become the
norm, which means that de facto, there is an indirect communitarization of
CFSP as the Commission presents the budget, and the European Parliament
decides non-obligatory expenditures. In theory, CFSP has augmented the EU’s
competence to act in external matters. In practice, without the political will
necessary to adapt the decision-making machinery or to use it effectively,
CFSP has done more to raise and to disappoint expectations, than it has to
enhance the EU’s international role.69
However, unity in foreign policy is a dramatic step forward and has
made it easier for the EC to unify on commercial issues. As mentioned earlier,
there are several areas where this cohesion is likely to spill over and impact
the international arena. One example is that of competition policy, an area in
which the Commission has been active since the early 1960s. With increasing
worldwide economic interdependency and the emergence of global markets
for a large number of products, more competition cases involve actions that
take place outside of the EU,70 like the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
merger. In this respect, the EC-U.S. Cooperation Agreement (which provides
the background for the McDonnell Douglas case) is worth mentioning.
Competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic examined the issue, and
68

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1233.
The Treaty of Amsterdam: Text and Commentary (Andrew Duff ed., 1997).
70
PIET EECKHOUT, THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
69

24

EU Legal Personality

Rafael Leal-Arcas

came to different conclusions. This case shows that even in carrying out
policies that have traditionally been domestic, the EU is increasingly
influencing economic matters in other parts of the world.
In addition, nowhere is the effect of domestic policies likely to be as
relevant as with the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).71 The EMU is
essentially a domestic issue. However, EC authorities hope that the Euro will
benefit international trade, having a major impact both on international
markets, and on the weight attributed to the EU as an international actor. That
said, the variable geometry of the EMU with its ins and outs poses a challenge
for the unity of external representation in the economic sphere.72 To better
understand the implications of the unitary character of the EU (or lack
thereof), we must look at the legal interpretation of its role and responsibility.

C.- The Case of External Economic Relations

The European Parliament, as well as other institutions, uses the term European
Union when referring to the EC's external trade relations. However, lawyers
should know that it is the European Community, and not the European Union,
the one which has competence in the field of international trade relations.
Clearly, the European Community is part of the European Union, but the latter

TRADE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1994).
71
PAUL BRETON ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A EUROPEAN TEXT (1997).
72
NICHOLAS EMILIOU & DAVID O´KEEFFE, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD
TRADE LAW: AFTER TH GATT URUGUAY ROUND (1996).
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does not have international legal personality stricto sensu.73 The European
Union is, therefore, not a member of international organizations.74 That is why
it is said that the EU does not negotiate in the World Trade Organization’s
agreements – it is the Commission instead- and is not a member of such an
organization. It may be politically convenient to refer to the European Union
rather than to the European Community as an international economic actor,
but it is incorrect.75
EC external relations are not limited to the field of trade policy. The
Treaty is not very explicit about these other dimensions, but the European
Court of Justice has attempted to clarify them. In the famous ERTA case on
road transportation (Case 22/70, Commission v. Council),76 the Court ruled
that a matter already regulated by the EU institutions could not be dealt with
internationally without Community participation and approval, precisely
because it has been regulated by an EU institution. External activity can take
three main forms: 1) autonomous legislation, to set out rules for relations for
the outside world; 2) negotiation, to arrive at agreements with third parties;
and 3) dialogue, to gain a better understanding of other parties in order to

73

This is a very debatable issue among scholars and practitioners. Some authors argue that the
EU does have legal personality through Article 24 TEU.
74
Paemen, H. “The European Union in International Affairs: Recent Developments,”
Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 22, 1999, pp. 136-48.
75
See Van den Bossche, P.L.H., “The European Community and the Uruguay Round
Agreements” in Jackson, J. & Sykes, A. Implementing the Uruguay Round, Clarendon Press
Oxford, 1997, footnote 1, p. 23.
76
Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, 1971 E.C.R. 263.
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better determine their own attitudes.77 It was the dialogue that gained
importance in the late 1970s.
In this context, we see that the EU now has diplomatic delegations in
many capitals as well as in the U.N. headquarters (where it obtained official
observer status in 1975). Since 1973, the EU has conducted a systematic
dialogue with the U.S., Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, separate
from the periodic discussions that take place regularly within the OECD. Since
1977, the EU has also been involved in the economic world summits of the
seven major industrialized nations, the so-called G 7.78
Already in the late 1970s, the Community had become an important
interlocutor, not only in trade but also in areas such as energy, fisheries and
development policies. The Community was already a major actor in most
world fora, often speaking with one voice, even if some aspects of the debate
were not under its direct competence. Examples of this were the Conference
on International Economic Cooperation (the so-called “North-South
Dialogue”) in Paris in 1976-1977, when the Community had one single
delegation to cover all points of the agenda, and the Euro-Arab dialogue.
During the period of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), the U.S. continued to
have much influence in world trade. Some of the early initiatives toward the
Tokyo Round came from the American side such as the William Commission.
77

Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, External Relations Powers of the European Community, 22
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 149 (1999).
78
The main difference between the G8 and the G7 (both coexist) is that the G8 deals with
political matters and includes Russia as a member, whereas the G7 is for economic matters,
and Russia is excluded.
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That said, the EC and the U.S. held informal discussions on various issues
throughout the Tokyo Round to avoid major potential confrontation. When the
U.S. and EC did not cooperate, there was a deadlock in the negotiations of the
Tokyo Round since they had effective veto power. When the U.S. and the EC
adopted a unified position, the combined efforts of others had minor chances
of changing the outcome.79
Looking back to the 1950s, what is most surprising is the place the EC
now holds in world affairs. When the process of European integration started,
the role of the EC in the international arena was minimal. As time has gone
by, it has developed a greater role in international fora. There are a few
important examples of EC action in the international arena in 1997. In the
trade sector, the EC played an important role in two significant WTO
agreements: the Telecommunications Service Agreement,80 which covers
about 90% of world revenues in the telecommunications sector and the
Agreement on Financial Services, which covers about 95% of trade in the
banking, insurance, and security sectors.
In the same year, the EU donated Euros 438 million in humanitarian
aid, and an EU special envoy was sent to support the Middle East Peace
Process. The EU has adopted a strong position with regard to problematic
states such as Cuba and Burma and led the industrialized nations in their
79

Golt, S. The GATT Negotiations 1973-1979: The Closing Stage, (London, British-North
American Committee), May 1978, p.1; Winham, “The Prenegotiation Phase of the Uruguay
Round,” pp.289-290; Thomas, J.C. “The GATT and Multilateral Treaty Making: The Tokyo
Round,” American Journal of International Law 77 (1983), pp. 70-71.
80
Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO 1997), 36 I.L.M.
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decision to reduce greenhouse emissions by the year 2010 at the Kyoto
Summit on Climate Change81 in the Conference of the Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, in December
1997.82 Clearly, the EU has developed into a significant actor in many
international spheres.
That said, it is important to note that more than just traditional external
policies will define the EU’s role. As the EU has integrated to create a single
European Market with a single currency, its domestic policies are increasingly
influencing its role in the international arena.83 Since 1958, the vision of the
EEC Founders has been expanding geographically as the EU has grown from
six members to the current 25. With the Single European Act84 and the
completion of the single market, economic integration has created a cohesive
entity. Already in 1973, with the first enlargement of the EC to nine Member
States, the EC had become the world’s largest trading bloc.

354, 366 (1997).
81
Leal-Arcas, R. “Is the Kyoto Protocol an Adequate Environmental Agreement to Solve the
Climate Change Problem?,” in European Environmental Law Review, Vol. 10, Issue 10,
winter 2001, pp. 282-294.
82
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
83
David O’Keeffe, Community and Member State Competence in External Relations
Agreements of the EU, 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 7 (1999).
84
The Single European Act (SEA) was signed on February 17, 1986 in Luxembourg by
representatives of the then twelve EC Member States. The Danish Parliament had rejected the
project of institutional reform, but the Danish people approved it by referendum on February
27, 1986. Apart from minor modifications, this Treaty was the first profound and wideranging constitutional reform of the EU since the 1950s. The SEA introduced measures aimed
at achieving an internal market (for instance, harmonization) plus institutional changes related
to these (such as a generalization of qualified majority voting and a cooperation procedure
involving the European Parliament). It also provided legal form for European Political
Cooperation.
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The 12-member EC of 1986 was already the largest trading power in
the world. However, the EC, just like the U.S., showed some significant
internal weaknesses to the outside world: although the European Commission
has the power to initiate and execute decisions for its Member States in
international trade negotiations, its proposals must, by law, first be approved
by the EU Council. Some authors argue that this internal division is
detrimental for the EC’s role as leader in the international trading system.85
Toward the end of the Uruguay Round (early 90s), the U.S. leadership was
being weakened. President Clinton utilized U.S. protectionist pressures which
slowed the moves toward a Uruguay Round agreement. By contrast, Leon
Brittan, EU trade commissioner at the time, adopted a more assertive role.
This made the leadership between the U.S. and the EC in the framework of the
Uruguay Round more balanced.
In the late 1990s, the EC devoted important efforts to encouraging other
countries to launch a comprehensive WTO round. One of the reasons for the
EC to favor a more comprehensive and broader agenda was that it believed
there would be more opportunities for cross-cutting agreements among
sectors. It would also facilitate progress in the negotiations themselves.
However, the EC had neither the economic power nor the unity of purpose to
replace the U.S. as a leader in the world trading system. Thus, a degree of
consensus was necessary between the U.S. and the EC if a new WTO round

85

Cohn, T.H. Governing Global Trade. International institutions in conflict and convergence,
Ashgate, 2002, at p. 282.
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was to be possible. The U.S. and the EC have both become highly dependent
on trade and they both had a shared interest in launching the new WTO round
at Doha.86

D.- A Debate on Competences in Foreign (Economic) Policy

Within the EU, there is exclusive and non-exclusive Community competence.
In addition, Torrent speaks of other competences of the Member States which
are exercised outside the institutional framework of the EU. However, in those
cases where Member States exercise their competences outside the
institutional framework of the EU, they must respect the obligations imposed
by EC law (and by the Maastricht Treaty, as well). As we can deduce from
this framework, the actors with a given legal personality and competences are
the EC and its Member States. On the one hand, the Community always acts in
the framework of the EU, since its institutional system has been taken by the
TEU as an institutional system of the Union. On the other hand, its Member
States may act outside the EU’s institutional system.
Examples where Member States act outside the EU’s institutional
system are inter alia when in January 2000 the German Foreign Affairs
Minister, Mr Fischer (or any Minister from any EU Member State, for that
matter) went to Moscow to see the Prime Minister of Russia, Mr Putin. In this

86

Cohn, T.H. Governing Global Trade. International institutions in conflict and convergence,
Ashgate, 2002, at p. 284.
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case, the German Minister visited Moscow on a bilateral basis and not
representing the EU. Another example is the decision adopted by 14 EU
Member States against Austria in February 2000 because of the creation of a
new Government in Vienna with a national socialistic coalition. Measures at
the highest political level were taken to show the other 14 Member States’
disagreement with the creation of such a Government in Vienna. Again, these
measures were taken individually by each and every Member State of the then
EU-15. Also, the humanitarian aid donated by Member States individually to
the terrible events that occurred in Rwanda in 1997 is another example of
Member States acting outside the EU’s institutional system.
However, in certain cases Member States' competences can be
exercised within the institutional system of the Union.87 Here one should
understand that there are two functions of the Treaty establishing the
European Community (TEC) which must be distinguished: 1) scope of
application of the TEC and 2) scope of competence of the TEC. By this we
mean, for example, that although criminal law is not outside the scope of
application of the TEC, it is competence of the Member States. Another clear
example is with education policies. At the moment, there is no common
education policy in the EU. Therefore, it is an issue of national competence.
However, it is no longer possible to discriminate against other nationals of any
Member State of the Union when applying for a post as a teacher by virtue of

87

See Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans l'Union
Europeenne, in http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998, chapter 1.
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not being nationals of the country where the application is taking place. In
other words, it is no longer possible to restrict eligibility to a public teaching
post on the basis of nationality within the EU.
As a personal interpretation, it is obvious that there is a commitment
among the Member States to put into practice all the necessary tools in order
to achieve the goals of the EC Treaty. Perhaps this table might clarify in a
visual way what has been said so far:

Scope

Actors

Competence

Inside the European

European Community89

Exclusive EC Competence91

Union’s88 institutional

(European institutions

Non-exclusive (shared)

framework

and EU Member States)90 Competence92

88

This new entity embraces both the Treaty of Rome and the two pillars of intergovernmental
activity –Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice/Home Affairs-.
89
As mentioned above, the EC is a supranational organization, i.e., one to which the Member
States have transferred specific legislative and executive powers and whose decisions are
binding on them and their citizens. For further details, see Drost, H. What’s what and Who’s
who in Europe, Cassell, 1995, p. 207.
90
By European institutions, we understand those institutions which deal with European issues
and which are not national institutions. In the Community terminology, the first pillar deals
with the European Communities (I should like to remind that throughout this dissertation, the
term European Community shall be used to refer to the two remaining European
Communities), whereas the second and third pillars have an intergovernmental character and,
therefore, Member States deal with them.
91
See, in this respect, Leal-Arcas, R. “Exclusive or Shared Competence in the Common
Commercial Policy: From Amsterdam to Nice,” Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 30(1):
3-14, 2003, as well as Leal-Arcas, R. “The European Community and Mixed Agreements,”
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 6, Issue 4, Winter 2001, pp. 483-513, Kluwer Law
International.
92
Id.
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Member States93

CFSP,94

(Government, national
Parliament and interest

police and judicial
cooperation in criminal
matters95

groups)

4th Pillar96

Outside the European

Member States act

Exclusive Member States’

Union’s institutional

independently from the

competence98

framework

EU97

It is also important to say a few words about what Torrent calls the
"fourth pillar" of the EU's institutional structure. If the reader studies the
Maastricht Treaty,99 he or she will perceive that the CFSP has a very large
scope, and that it covers the actions of EU Member States in the areas of
external economic relations.100 In fact,

1.

Article 12 (ex-Article J.2) of the Maastricht Treaty refers to
"any matter of foreign and security policy" and to "action in

93

Member States, as actors in EC legislation, deal with CFSP and police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters, which are forms of intergovernmental co-operation. They
retain full sovereign rights, and hence, decision making is by unanimity. See, for further
details, Drost, H. What’s what and Who’s who in Europe, Cassell, 1995, p. 207.
94
CFSP stands for Common Foreign and Security Policy, which appears on Title V of the
Treaty on European Union.
95
It appears on Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.
96
The idea of the “fourth pillar” is a creation of Ramòn Torrent.
97
However, formally speaking, Member States have to follow the EC legal order. Even if
Member States act bilaterally, they will be affected by the EC legal order.
98
This covers areas in which the EC Treaty forbids the EC to legislate.
99
The numbering of the Maastricht Treaty Articles is not the original one, but follows the
changes made by the post-Maastricht Intergovernmental Conferences.
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international organisations and at international conferences"
without exception (therefore, without excluding economic
conferences);101
2.

Article 13 of the Maastricht Treaty also has a general
scope;102 and finally,

3.

Article 3 of the Maastricht Treaty establishes that "the Union
shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external
activities as a whole in the context of its external relations,
security, economic and development policies."103

100

Winter, J., Curtin, D., Kellermann, A. & de Witte, B. (eds.) Reforming the Treaty on
European Union. The Legal Debate, Kluwer Law International, 1996.
101
Article 12 (ex-Article J.2) of the Maastricht Treaty reads:
1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of
foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence
is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position.
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at
international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.
In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member
States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.
102
Article 13 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union reads:
1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the
common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union
in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available
by the Union and the Member States.
3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common
foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European
Council.
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall
implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.
103
Article 3 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union reads: The Union
shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the
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However, no one has given such a broad interpretation of the CFSP.
Why is this so? An authentic interpretation of the CFSP is one that addresses
in the best of all possible ways, the interests of those civil servants who had
to put the CFSP in action:
1. from the point of view of the EU's national Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, the idea was to "keep" the CFSP for them,
even if they did not like it so much;
2. from the point of view of the Commission, there was only one
strategy concerning the external economic relations, i.e., to
extend the exclusive competence of the European Community
as far as possible. This strategy was incompatible with an
efficient co-ordination of the external economic policies of the
Member States in the framework of the CFSP.
It is this restrictive interpretation of the CFSP which necessarily
provokes the development of what Torrent calls the "fourth pillar" of the
EU.104 The term restrictive does not suggest a possible inclination of the

continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and
building upon the acquis communautaire.
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the
context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council
and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to
this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its
respective powers.
104
One interesting point by Professor Torrent is the fact that making reference to the "fourth
pillar" of the Union shows how the language of "three pillars" does not let us comprehend
correctly the nature of the European Union.
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CFSP toward the EC competences, but rather toward the side of the Member
States acting outside the institutional framework of the EU. The so-called
"fourth pillar" shows how within the institutional framework of the EU, the
de facto common exercise of Member States' competences is mainly, but not
exclusively, on issues of external economic relations. We may illustrate this
with two very significant examples taken from multilateral and bilateral
relations:
1. when dealing with the management of the World Trade
Organization Agreements, it is the Council of Ministers of the
European Union which acts not only on behalf of the EC, but
also on behalf of the Member States in the matters in which
they are competent;
2. the Association Agreements with the republics of the former
Soviet Union deal mainly with the agreed treatment to the
enterprises. This issue reveals Member States' competences.
Proof of it lies in Opinion 2/92 of the European Court of
Justice of 24 March 1995,105 which deals with the competence
of the Community or of one of its institutions to participate in
the third revised decision of the Council of the OECD106
concerning national treatment. These agreements have been
negotiated, and are integrally managed after their final
105

ECR I-521.
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conclusion, by the Council of the European Union and the
European Commission.
Torrent justifies the existence of a fourth pillar by saying that the
exercise of Member States' external economic competences within the
institutional framework of the EU does not show signs of being part of the
"third pillar," "second pillar,"107 or "first pillar."108 Therefore, we must
speak of a fourth pillar, if we wish to continue the linguistic usage of
pillars.
However, there are at least three comments to make regarding what
has been said so far:
- first comment: in order to fully understand the above table, a clear
distinction between the scope of EC competences and the range of
application of the EC Treaty must be made. Let us make use of two
examples in order to explain this distinction.

106

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a forum of 30
countries for discussion of economic policies between industrialised market economies,
sharing a commitment to democratic government and the market economy.
107
Even less so in the second pillar if we take into account the restrictive interpretation which
has been given to the CFSP, which is the second pillar.
108
It could not be part of this pillar since we are dealing precisely with the exercise of
Member States' competences, and not with that of the Community's.
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Example one: Articles 149,109 150 (education, vocational training,
and youth),110 151 (culture),111 and 152 EC (public health),112 limit the

109

Article 149 EC reads:

1. The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their
action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of
teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.
2. Community action shall be aimed at:
- developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and
dissemination of the languages of the Member States,
- encouraging mobility of students and teachers, by encouraging inter alia, the academic
recognition of diplomas and periods of study,
- promoting cooperation between educational establishments,
- developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the education
systems of the Member States,
- encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socioeducational
instructors,
- encouraging the development of distance education.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and
the competent international organisations in the field of education, in particular the Council of
Europe.
4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the
Council:
- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after consulting the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive
measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States,
- acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt
recommendations.
110
Article 150 EC:
1. The Community shall implement a vocational training policy which shall support and
supplement the action of the Member States, while fully respecting the responsibility of the
Member States for the content and organisation of vocational training.
2. Community action shall aim to:
- facilitate adaptation to industrial changes, in particular through vocational training and
retraining,
- improve initial and continuing vocational training in order to facilitate vocational integration
and reintegration into the labour market,
- facilitate access to vocational training and encourage mobility of instructors and trainees and
particularly young people,
- stimulate cooperation on training between educational or training establishments and firms,
- develop exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the training systems
of the Member States.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and
the competent international organisations in the sphere of vocational training.
4. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt
measures to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this article,
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.
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Article 151 EC reads:

1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States,
while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the
common cultural heritage to the fore.
2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member
States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:
- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European
peoples,
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance,
- non-commercial cultural exchanges,
- artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and
the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of
Europe.
4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions
of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.
5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the
Council:
- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the
Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of
the laws and regulations of the Member States. The Council shall act unanimously throughout
the procedure referred to in Article 251,
- acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.
112
Article 152 EC reads:
1. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and
implementation of all Community policies and activities.
Community action, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards
improving public health, preventing human illness and diseases, and obviating sources of
danger to human health. Such action shall cover the fight against the major health scourges, by
promoting research into their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as health
information and education.
The Community shall complement the Member States' action in reducing drugs-related health
damage, including information and prevention.
2. The Community shall encourage cooperation between the Member States in the areas
referred to in this Article and, if necessary, lend support to their action.
Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordinate among themselves their
policies and programmes in the areas referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission may, in
close contact with the Member States, take any useful initiative to promote such coordination.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and
the competent international organisations in the sphere of public health.
4. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall
contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this article through adopting:
(a)
measures setting high standards of quality and safety of organs and substances of
human origin, blood and blood derivatives; these measures shall not prevent any Member
State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures;
(b)
by way of derogation from Article 37, measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary
fields which have as their direct objective the protection of public health;
(c)
incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health, excluding any
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.
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Community's competence. Any kind of harmonization of legal provisions
of the Member States is excluded from the scope of these Articles.
However, this limitation does not mean that the national legislations in
culture, education or health exceed the range of application of the treaties.
They must respect the general principle of non-discrimination based on
nationality, and its specific translation in the field of the four freedoms in
EU law.113
Example two: concerning the criminal legislation of Member States,
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has established that Member States
must respect the general principles of EC law. If, for example, an infraction
to customs regulations, before 1st January 1993 –date of completion of the
internal market- was liable to a fine applicable to intra-Community trade, it
should respect the principle of proportionality.114 The conclusions by the

The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may also
adopt recommendations for the purposes set out in this article.
5. Community action in the field of public health shall fully respect the responsibilities of the
Member States for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care. In
particular, measures referred to in paragraph 4(a) shall not affect national provisions on the
donation or medical use of organs and blood.
113
Let us remember for the non-specialised reader that the four freedoms are the free
movement of goods, the free movement of persons, the free movement of capital and the
freedom to provide services. This is certainly one of the great achievements of the EU, which
has been able to create a frontier-free area within which people, goods, services and money
can all move around freely.
114
The principle of proportionality implies that any action by the EC should not go beyond
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the EC Treaty. It should not be confused with
the principles of subsidiarity, which enables the resolution of the considered action’s level
(national of Community level), while the principle of proportionality concerns the size of the
action. This principle has appeared in Court decisions since 1956, for example Coal
Federation of Belgium –judgment of November 26, 1956.
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Advocate-General Van Gerven in the case 212/88115 have a general
appreciation of the Court's decisions over this issue.
The distinction made from these two examples shows that
Community treaties have two different functions. On the one hand, the
typical function of an international treaty, i.e., to limit the exercise of the
competences of the contracting parties (in other words, of the Member
States when they are competent). On the other hand, the specific function
of transferring a competence to the Community. This function of
transferring competences to the Community is very specific, but not
exclusive of Community treaties. The fact of not making this distinction
has generated very generalized mistakes in the analysis of the distribution
of external competences between the Community and its Member States.
There was no distinction between the range of application of the treaties
and the scope of EC competences. This mistake had terrible consequences
when it was combined with the also mistaken thesis by which EC nonexclusive competences become exclusive competences when there is a need
to act at the international level. The combination of these two mistakes was
the genesis of the thesis by which all the Agreements of the Uruguay
Round were exclusive EC competence.
- second comment: it should be underlined that there is a fine line
between what EU Member States do outside and inside the institutional

115

Ruling of the European Court of Justice of the European Communities of 26 October
1989, ECR p. 3523.
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system of the EU. The earlier example of former Yugoslavia is helpful
here. Certain EU Member States decided to send troops outside the
institutional system of the Union. But to what extent have the diplomatic
initiatives from the various EU Member States been inside or outside the
framework of the CFSP? And who pays for what in this same example?
The same case would apply mutatis mutandis to the participation of the
peace process in the Middle East. The best example of Member States'
activities which are borderline with the Union's institutional system is the
EU's participation in the UN.
- third comment: the table shown above is divided into three columns:
1) the scope of the EU’s institutional framework; 2) the actors, and 3) their
competences. It is not divided by issues. If we take the Schengen Agreement
as an example, we can observe how this agreement used to be based outside
the institutional framework of the EU. Nowadays, it is inside the institutional
framework of the EU. The issues dealt with in the Schengen Agreement are,
therefore, treated inside the institutional framework of the EU, as Member
States’ competences. Some of these issues are also treated as Community
competence.116 This is a very important point when it comes to external
relations: very often a specific problem of international politics can be
treated in various ways. The fact of being treated in one way or another has
not only legal but also political consequences. The means taken and the
foreseeable results are different.
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Experience has proven that one of the bigger mistakes of the usage of
pillars is that it prevents the same issue from being used in different ways.
With the system of pillars in mind, people tend to ask to which pillar a
specific issue belongs. Since a good number of national administrations (and
certain services of the EU institutions) is organized by pillars instead of by
issues, it is no surprise that this question causes internal conflicts of power
and jealousy. This is why it is almost evident for national and Community
civil servants that the political dialogue with third States belongs to the
second pillar. However, joint declarations, which create this political
dialogue, do not limit their scope to questions which, inside the Union, are
treated within the framework of the CFSP.117 How can we then pretend to
avoid third States form raising questions which relate to EC exclusive
competence in the framework of this dialogue?
It should not be necessary to underline that the right approach is
precisely the opposite of the one that comes from asking the question to what
pillar a certain issue belongs. The issue must be analyzed from all possible
angles in order to obtain the best solution. When various possible angles give
different ways of action, then this approach implies a difficulty, namely that
it has to guarantee coherence among the various ways of action. But
politicians, senior civil servants, and jurists are paid by taxpayers to resolve

116
117

Budge, I., Newton, K. et al. The Politics of the New Europe, Longman, 1997.
Hill, C. (ed.) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, Routledge, 1996.
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these kinds of difficulties and not to find the way (intellectually easy but the
wrong way) of putting each issue in only one of the potential ways of action.

III. Legal Personality of the European Community

From what is said above, it can be deduced that both Communities, given the
supranational powers conferred on them and their institutions, satisfy the
criteria for international legal personality, which appears in the Reparations
case.118 The precedent of the Reparations case could have been limited in the
sense that the opinion was related to an organization created by a number of
States which comprised the vast majority of members of the international
community at that time. Nowadays, there is almost no doubt that international
organizations can have objective international personality, even when they
have been brought into existence by only a limited number of States.119 In
addition, as we see in Article 281 EC, Article 184 Euratom,120 and Article 6
(1) of the already expired ECSC,121 each Community Treaty expressly confers
legal personality on the organization it creates.122 Furthermore, each Treaty

118

For an explanation on the Reparations Case, see McGoldrick, D. International Relations
Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 26-8.
119
McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at p.
28.
120
Article 184 Euratom reads: The Community shall have legal personality.
121
Article 6 (1) ECSC reads: The Community shall have legal personality.
122
For a study on the ECSC, see Blumann C., Communauté européenne du charbon et de
l’acier, in Rép. communautaire, Dalloz, Paris, 1992, 1; see also Caia G. and Aicardi N.,
Carbone e siderurgia, in Chiti M.P. e Greco G., Trattato di diritto amministrativo europeo,
Giuffrè, Milano, II, 1997, 386 ; Mathijsen P., Le droit de la Communauté européenne du
charbon et de l’acier. Une étude des sources, Nijhoff, La Haye, 1958, 62 ; Monaco R.,
Comunità economica europea del carbone e dell’acciaio (CECA), in Enc. giur., Istituto
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confers powers on the Community to act in the international scene by
concluding international agreements.123 Since there is a considerable exercise
of these powers, even the exercise of developing the Communities’
participation in other international organizations, this is clear evidence of the
recognition accorded by the international community to the legal capacity of
the Communities under public international law.124
The international legal personality of the EC125 has an objective
existence in the international system even as regards states which do not
recognize it.126 Let us remember that until 1988, the EC was not recognized127
as an international organization by the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA, or commonly known as COMECON128).129 This position
poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, Roma, 1988, 1-7; Panebianco M., Sub art.76 of the ECSC
Treaty, in Quadri R., Monaco R. and Trabucchi A., Trattato istitutivo della Comunità europea
del carbone e dell’acciaio cit., 1105; Pilotti M., C.E.C.A. (Comunità europea del carbone e
dell’acciaio), in Novissimo digesto italiano, UTET, 1959, 75-87; Saulle M.R., Su la natura
giuridica dei crediti spettanti alla CECA a titolo di prelievo generale, in RDI 1965, 634;
Scovazzi T., Carbone e acciaio nel diritto comunitario, in Digesto delle discipline
pubblicistiche, UTET, Torino, 1987, 493-502; Vignes D., La Communauté européenne du
charbon et de l’acier: un exemple d’administration économique international, avec une
préface de Paul Guggenheim, George Thone, Liege, 1956, 51; Zanghì C., Comunità europea
del carbone e dell’acciaio, in Enc. Dir. Aggiornamento, V, Giuffrè, Milano, 2001, 238-240;
Tesauro G., Sulla natura giuridica del prelievo C.E.C.A., in Rass.dir.pub. 1972, 221.
123
See mainly Article 300 EC.
124
Macloeod, I., Hendry. I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities,
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, p. 31.
125
See Macleod, I., Hendry. I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European
Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, chapter 2 and Frid, R. The Relations between the
EC and International Organizations. Legal Theory and Practice, Kluwer Law Inernational,
1995, pp. 21-6.
126
McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at p.
28.
127
As evidence of this, see inter alia the Council Decision 88/345, [1988] OJ L 154/34.
128
COMECON was an economic organization from 1949 to 1991, linking the USSR with
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, East Germany (1950–1990), Mongolia
(from 1962), Cuba (from 1972), and Vietnam (from 1978), with Yugoslavia as an associated
member. Albania also belonged between 1949 and 1961. Its establishment was prompted by
the Marshall Plan. Comecon was formally disbanded in June 1991. It was agreed in 1987 that
official relations should be established with the European Community, and a free-market
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adopted by COMECON was rectified shortly before COMECON was
dissolved. In any event, it is pertinent to examine the provisions of the EC
Treaty that are relevant to the EC’s international relations. In this respect, we
refer to Part VI of the Treaty of Rome, Articles 281-312. As explained earlier,
positive law is clear and precise. Article 281 EC reads:

The Community shall have legal personality.

This proves the personality of the EC in international law, and not just
in each of the Member States. Article 282 EC corroborates this statement even
more clearly, by saying that the Community shall also “enjoy the most
extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons” in each of the Member
States.130 In such a case, the EC is represented by the Commission. Examples
of it are Case T-451/93, San Marco Impex Italiana SA v Commission,131 and
Case C-257/90, Italsolar SpA v Commission.132
Let us now tackle the more controversial question of the EU's legal
personality.
approach to trading was adopted in 1990. In January 1991 it was agreed that Comecon should
be
effectively
disbanded.
See
http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0006083.html (last visited June
30, 2005).
129
See Morawiecki, W. “Actors and Interests in the Process of Negotiations between the
CMEA and the EEC,” 1989/2, Legal Issues of European Integration, pp. 1-38.
130
Article 282 EC reads:
In each of the Member States, the Community shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity
accorded to legal persons under their laws; it may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable
and immovable property and may be a party to legal proceedings. To this end, the Community
shall be represented by the Commission.
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IV. Legal Personality of the European Union?133

Lawyers have long discussed whether the EU can have external relations at
all. This is because the Treaties confer legal personality to the two remaining
Communities and not to the Union as such. When treaties are concluded in the
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU
technically lacks legal personality.134 However, as we will analyze later, the
situation with respect to the EU legal personality has fundamentally changed
since the enforcement of the Treaty of Amsterdam,135 although Article 24
TEU136 refers to the conclusion of CFSP agreements by the Council.137
131

[1994] ECR II-1061.
[1990] ECR I-3841.
133
Tizzano A., «La personalità internazionale dell’Unione europea», in Dir. Un. Europea
1998, 394.
134
Eaton, M.R. Common Foreign and Security Policy, in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.)
LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p.
224.
135
Rosas, A. The European Union and mixed agreements, in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C.
(eds.) THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 203.
136
Article 24 TEU reads:
132

1. When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international
organisations in implementation of this title, the Council may authorise the Presidency,
assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such
agreements shall be concluded by the Council on a recommendation from the Presidency.
2. The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement covers an issue for which
unanimity is required for the adoption of internal decisions.
3. When the agreement is envisaged in order to implement a joint action or common position,
the Council shall act by a qualified majority in accordance with Article 23(2).
4. The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI. When the
agreement covers an issue for which a qualified majority is required for the adoption of
internal decisions or measures, the Council shall act by a qualified majority in accordance
with Article 34(3).
5. No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council
states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other
members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall nevertheless apply provisionally.
6. Agreements concluded under the conditions set out by this Article shall be binding on the
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The Maastricht Treaty created a new entity, the European Union, and
“fundamentally changed the organizational framework and structure around
the EC. It introduced two intergovernmental pillars, one on [...] CFSP and one
on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).”138 Although the Maastricht Treaty did
not want to give the EU a legal personality in an explicit way, none of its
provisions prevents the EU from developing such a personality in a
progressive way. In fact, to a non-expert in international affairs, it might
appear that the EU has a legal personality. If that is not the case, how could
this non-expert interpret the various positions, as well as political and legal
engagements, under the Union’s name? If, despite all these legal and political
engagements, the Union does not have (yet) a legal personality,139 then the
reason for it must be found inside the European Union. It is the composing
entities of the European Union (not only the Member States, but also the
Community and, in particular, two of its institutions -the Commission and the
Council) which have refused in the past to accept this personality. When
looking at the functional approach of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
one can deduce that the EU could have international legal personality.

institutions of the Union.
137
Paasivirta, The European Union: From an Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?, 2
Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium, 1997, pp. 37-59.
138
McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at p.
4.
139
This issue would be solved by the EU Constitutional Treaty, which explicitly gives legal
personality to the EU.
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Nevertheless, it has been asserted that the EU does not have international legal
personality.140
Let us start with an analysis of the arguments against the existence of
an EU legal personality.

A.- Arguments against the Existence of an EU Legal Personality141

In evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European
Communities, Eaton stated that “…we do not believe that the Union will
constitute an international organisation with a separate international legal
personality. It would be better characterised as an association of Member
States which, for certain purposes described in the Treaty, act in common.”142
Eaton set out the reasoning behind this in the following way:

1. “There is no provision in the Treaty on European Union similar
to Article 210 (new Article 281) of the Treaty of Rome, which
expressly says that the Community shall have legal
personality”.

143

140

See McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997,
at p. 37.
141
The arguments here are almost entirely based on the pre-Amsterdam Treaty. The comments
are of historical interest and might have been affected by later developments of the postAmsterdam Treaty.
142
See declaration by Eaton, M.R. in House of Lords Select Committee on the European
Communities, Human Rights Reexamined, Session 1992-93, 3rd Report, HL Paper 10, pr. 129.
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However, as McGoldrick rightly points out, “international personality
could be inherent or potential in the EU on a functional basis, applying the
approach of the ICJ in the Reparations Case.”144

2. “Various functions that you would expect the Union to
exercise, if it did have such personality, are in fact exercised by
the Community, e.g. all the provisions on concluding external
Treaties are in the Community Treaty and provide for the
Community to conclude such Treaties. There are no such
powers given to the Union, in CFSP or else where. Similarly,
citizenship is in the Community section.”

145

Here Eaton was right. The Community (and not the Union) concludes
international agreements, either alone or together with some or all of the
Member States.146 According to McGoldrick, the Union would be capable of
possessing international personality if it were recognized by other
international actors when trying to conclude, or be party to, international
agreements under any of the three EU pillars.147

143

Eaton, M.R. “Common Foreign and Security Policy” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.)
Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p. 224.
144
See McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997,
at p. 37.
145
Eaton, M.R. “Common Foreign and Security Policy” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.)
Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p. 224.
146
If it is in the latter case, then we are dealing with mixed agreements, which are agreements
where both the EC and its Member States are contracting parties, on the European side, to an
international agreement with a third party.
147
See McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997,
at p. 37.
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“The evidence of the (unpublished) travaux preparatoires:
there was a clear intention during negotiations not to confer
legal personality. The question was raised, and the Dutch
Presidency said firmly that the Union would not have legal
personality. They were supported by the Director General of
the Council Legal Service. The Director General of the
Commission Legal Service has taken the same view in
evidence to the European Parliament.”

148

This view mentioned by Eaton concerning the position of the EU
Council legal service in relation to the EU legal personality has radically
changed. In fact, in February 2000, at the EU Council, there were interesting
legal debates as to whether the EU has, and is capable of having, legal
personality. Already in 1992, the UK took the view that the Union will not
have international legal personality. However, at the 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference (IGC), the European Parliament (EP) called for the Union to be
given international personality.149 This, in principle, proves and demonstrates
that the EP accepts the fact that the EU does not have international legal
personality for the time being. The Commission also appeared to accept this
view.150 The question of the EU’s international legal personality was also

148

Eaton, M.R. “Common Foreign and Security Policy” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.)
Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p. 224.
149
European Parliament’s Report to the 1996 IGC, pr. 14 (ii).
150
See Commission’s Report to the 1996 IGC, p. 64.
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addressed in the Reflection Group for the 1996 IGC. Its final report stated as
follows:

“A majority of members points to the advantage of
international legal personality for the Union so that it can
conclude international agreements on the subject-matter of
Titles V and VI concerning the CFSP and the external
dimension of justice and home affairs. For them, the fact that
the Union does not legally exist is a source of confusion
outside and diminishes its external role. Others consider that
the creation of international legal personality for the Union
could risk confusion with the legal prerogatives of member
151

states.”

Along these lines, McGoldrick argues:

“if the EU did have international personality then it
would be very wide ranging, though still not plenary. Indeed,
it would come very close to having all of the international
personality of a state. That is, no doubt, an important factor

151

Report of the Reflection Group on the Intergovernmental Conference, December 1995, 2,
p. 40.
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for those states that oppose international personality for the
EU.”

152

Nonetheless, as can be gathered from the Progress Report on IGC,
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Florence, 21-22 June
1996, it should be possible to have provisions drafted that would enable the
EU, instead of the EC, to be party to international agreements without
modifying the principles of competence in the EU pillar.153 For the EU, being
a party to international agreements concerning the two intergovernmental
pillars could also be useful as long as a clear provision was made to deal with
questions of competence, and the relationship with the powers of the Member
States.154
This state of affairs provokes contradictions, even situations that are
difficult to explain. This is mainly the case where the consequence of this
refusal to having a legally engaged European Union brings to accepting the
Commission to sign memoranda of understanding on behalf of the Union (for
example, with the UN and its dependent organisms), although the Commission
does not have this competence under the framework of the TEU or the TEC.
For the time being, the European Union does not explicitly possess
legal personality. In other words, there is no Article in the treaties –unlike the

152

See McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997,
at p. 38.
153
See Progress Report on IGC, Presidency Conclusions, European Council in Florence, 2122 June 1996, Doc. SN300/96, Annexes, p. 36 at 2 (a).
154
Ibid., at 2 (b).
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case of the EC- which gives explicit legal personality to the EU. In this
respect, I would like to raise a hypothesis: what would happen if one day one
of the lorries with humanitarian aid from the European Union, in the
framework of a joint action within the structure of the CFSP, had an accident
in a village of former Yugoslavia or in the region of the Great Lakes,155 for
example? Who would be civilly responsible for this action? If an international
judiciary body had to examine such a case, how can we prevent this
organization from attributing responsibility to the EU for the accident and
damages? From here we can deduce that, if we want to be precise and
responsible, we should stop saying “the Union does...” and instead say, who
really does what: the Community, the EU Member States, or both together?
As mentioned earlier, during the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations, the
issue of the European Union’s legal personality was raised, thanks in
particular to the efforts of the legal advisor at the Amsterdam
Intergovernmental Conference. The idea of giving legal personality explicitly
to the Union in its own right was fought against not only by certain Member
States, but also, and mainly, by the Commission, possibly implying at the
same time a merger of the then three (currently two) existing legal persons –
the European Communities. The Commission foresaw, in recognizing the
legal personality of the Union, a kind of competition with the legal personality
155

The region of the Great Lakes of Africa refers to the region around the following lakes:
Lake Tanganyika, Lake Victoria - the world's third largest lake-, Lake Albert, Lake Edward,
Lake Kivu, and Lake Malawi. These include the entirety of the nations of Rwarnda, Burundi,
and Uganda as well as portions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and
Kenya.
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of the European Community and with the Commission’s role in the exercise of
the legal personality of the European Community. When we saw the
possibility of a merger of the EU’s legal personality with that of the EC’s legal
personality, this possibility appeared to the eyes of the Commission as a risk to
the Community’s identity. It is interesting to note, though, that this does not
prevent the delegations of the European Commission in third States from
presenting themselves as delegations of the “European Union.”
In the final text of the Amsterdam Treaty, any kind of explicit
recognition of the EU’s legal personality is avoided. However, a specific
Article recognizes the possibility that the Council of the European Union sign
international agreements under the framework of the CFSP and of JHA. The
Article (Art. 24 TEU)156 reads:

1. When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or
more States or international organisations in implementation of
this title, the Council may authorise the Presidency, assisted by
the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that
effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council on a
recommendation from the Presidency.
2. The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement
covers an issue for which unanimity is required for the
adoption of internal decisions.
3. When the agreement is envisaged in order to implement a
joint action or common position, the Council shall act by a
qualified majority in accordance with Article 23(2).
4. The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters
falling under Title VI. When the agreement covers an issue for
which a qualified majority is required for the adoption of
156

Article amended by the Treaty of Nice.
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internal decisions or measures, the Council shall act by a
qualified majority in accordance with Article 34(3).
5. No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose
representative in the Council states that it has to comply with
the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other
members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall
nevertheless apply provisionally.
6. Agreements concluded under the conditions set out by this
Article shall be binding on the institutions of the Union.

This Article creates interpretation problems which are not easy to
solve, especially if examined from the perspective of third States or
international organizations which are parties to these agreements. With whom
will they be internationally engaged: with the Union as such? With the entire
group of Member States of the Union? Two more points about putting into
practice such an Article:
1.- this Article shall not be applied if there is no need to make use of
the possibility described in the last phrase of the fifth paragraph of
Article 24 TEU;
2.- from a political point of view, these agreements will be referred to
as “European Union agreements” in the international arena. In any
event, all agreements concluded by the European Community are
classified by the media and the public opinion as “European Union
agreements,” and not as “pure Community agreements.”157
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Let us now present a legal analysis of Article 24 TEU and its
interpretation to see whether the EU might possess legal personality.

B.- Arguments for the Existence of an EU Legal Personality

B.1.- Analysis of Article 24 TEU: Its Interpretation and Application

Despite all the above said, there is an interpretation of Article 24 TEU which
gives the capacity of external action to the EU. For that, we shall try to
analyze the negotiation and conclusion of EU international agreements with
one or more third States in the framework of Titles V158 and VI159 of the TEU,
and the legal consequences which might derive from there.
To start with, Article 24 TEU is a provision which is part of an agreement
in public international law. Secondly, Article 24 TEU provides a certain
procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements on
CFSP with various States or international organizations. Thirdly and most
importantly, the main question is to know on behalf of whom agreements
under this provision are concluded. Even if it is not said explicitly in Article
24 TEU, those agreements concluded by the Council are agreements which are

157

In areas of non-exclusive EC competence, the EC can, if the EU Council of Ministers so
decides, enter into agreements with third countries without formal adherence of EU Member
States to these agreements, thereby having a so-called pure Community agreement.
158
TITLE V refers to provisions on a common foreign and security policy.
159
TITLE VI relates to provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
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concluded on behalf of the EU, and not on behalf of Member States. Here are
a few points to explain this view:

•

Let us interpret Article 24 TEU in the context of other provisions of the
TEU, and in particular of its Title V. We conclude that the EU can be
considered as an entity that is different and autonomous from its Member
States and which has, in the field of external relations, its own means of
action. Among these means of action are, inter alia, joint actions and
common positions adopted by the EU Council under the terms of Articles
14160 and 15 TEU.161 There is no doubt that both joint actions and common

160

Article 14 TEU (consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal C
325, 24 December 2002) reads:

1. The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations where
operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their
objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration,
and the conditions for their implementation.
2. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to
joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the
necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.
3. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the
conduct of their activity.
4. The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals
relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint
action.
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to
a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior
consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply
to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council
decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having
regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform
the Council immediately of any such measures.
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall
refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such
solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.
161
Article 15 TEU claims that: “The Council shall adopt common positions. Common
positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or
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positions adopted by the EU Council are acts of the EU, and not of the
Member States. It is also clear that when the Council adopts a joint action
or a common position, it acts as an institution of the EU. It is in this
context that Article 24 TEU should be considered as a means of action of
the EU in the international scenario. In other words, Article 24 TEU offers
the EU the option to participate in an international agreement.
•

When it is on the basis of Article 24 TEU, then the Council acts as a
common entity of all Member States, whereas on the basis of Articles 14
and 15 TEU, the EU Council acts as a European institution. In this regard,
it is important to note that, according to Article 3.1 TEU,162 the Union has
a single institutional framework and that, according to Article 3.2 TEU,163
the Council has the co-responsibility (with the Commission) to ensure the
consistency of the EU’s external activities. The Council should be
considered as the institution acting on behalf of the EU every time the
provisions of the TEU give a power of action to the Council and provide a
procedure. This can also be valid to Article 24 TEU. Had the intention of

thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the
common positions.”
162
Article 3.1 TEU reads:
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the
consistency and continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while
respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.
163
Article 3.2 TEU disposes:
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the
context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council
and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to
this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its
respective powers.
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the TEU lawmaker been to create the Council as an agency of EU Member
States, then the appropriate formula would have been to provide that the
decision to conclude such agreements would be adopted by the
representatives of Member States in the Council.
•

According to Article 24.1 TEU, the Presidency (assisted by the
Commission, if need be) is authorized by the Council to conduct
negotiations with another party. In the light of Article 18.1 TEU,164 the
Presidency shall represent the Union, and not the Member States. This
corroborates that Article 24 TEU provides a procedure of negotiating and
concluding agreements on behalf of the EU.

•

Finally, Article 24 TEU is part of Title V of the TEU. That said, according
to Article 11.1 TEU,165 it is the EU which defines and implements the
CFSP. As a result, an agreement concluded in application of Title V must
necessarily be an EU agreement in the framework of the CFSP.

164

Article 18.1 TEU says that the Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming
within the common foreign and security policy.
165
Article 11.1 TEU reads:
The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all
areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the
Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles
of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the
objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external boarders;
- to promote external cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
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Article 24.5 TEU mentions that “No agreement shall be binding on a
Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply
with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members
of the Council may agree that the agreement shall nevertheless apply
provisionally.” We can deduce that, in the absence of such a declaration by a
Member State, agreements concluded in the framework of Article 24 TEU are
binding on EU Member States. Such a provision would not make any sense if
in any case these agreements were to bind Member States and only the
Member States. This provision verifies the fact that agreements concluded in
the framework of Article 24 TEU are binding on the EU as well as on Member
States, except in cases mentioned in Article 24.5 TEU. In addition, Article 300
(7) EC166 says that agreements concluded by the EC are binding on Member
States. Therefore, Member States must act in conformity with such
agreements. Article 24 TEU should be interpreted in those same terms.
With regard to Declaration Number 4, adopted by the Amsterdam
Conference and annexed to the final act of the Amsterdam Treaty, concerning
Articles 24 (ex-Article J.14) and 38 (ex-Article K.10)167 of the Treaty on the
European Union, its content does not go against the above interpretation of
Article 24 TEU.168 Firstly, the content of this declaration implicitly recognizes

166

Article 300 (7) EC reads that “Agreements concluded under the conditions set out in this
Article shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States.”
167
Article 38 TEU reads: Agreements referred to in Article 24 may cover matters falling
under this title [provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters].
168
Declaration Number 4 on Articles J.14 and K.10 of the Treaty on European Union reads:
“The provisions of Articles J.14 and K.10 of the Treaty on European Union and any
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the existence of the EU as a separate entity from the Member States,
considering it provides a theoretical possibility of a transfer of competences
from the Member States to the EU. Secondly, although this declaration does
not mention the existence of an EU competence as derived from the existing
provisions of the TEU, the EU does have the necessary powers and
“competence” to define and implement a common foreign and security policy.
From this optic, Article 24 TEU does not increase this EU competence, since
it provides the conclusion of agreements “in implementation of this title [V on
provisions of a common foreign and security policy],”169 which means that the
competence has been attributed to the EU in other Articles of Title V of the
TEU. Therefore, agreements concluded under the terms of Article 24 TEU
must necessarily respect the framework of EU powers that derive from Title V
of the TEU.
From what is said above about Declaration Number 4, we cannot
deduce that agreements under Article 24 TEU are concluded on behalf of the
Member States. Article 24 TEU only establishes a process for the negotiation
and conclusion of agreements, but is neutral concerning the issue of
competences for Member States and for the EU.
Lastly, from a more practical viewpoint, it is unthinkable that the EU
cannot participate in the international scenario via international agreements.
For example, in the progressive framing of a common defence policy
agreements resulting from them shall not imply any transfer of competence from the Member
States to the European Union.”
169
Article 24.1 TEU.
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concerning relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of Western European
Union (WEU)170 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),171 the
EU should have the possibility to conclude the necessary agreements with
such institutions. In fact, as Article 17 TEU172 indicates, the common defence

170

The Western European Union (WEU) is a partially dormant European defence and security
organization, established on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 with the accession of
West Germany and Italy in 1954. The WEU is led by a Council of Ministers, assisted by a
Permanent Representatives Council on ambassadorial level. A Parliamentary Assembly rather unique for an intergovernmental organization- would oversee the work of the Council.
Most of the WEU functions are in the process of being merged into the EU. The Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council (composed of the delegations of the member states to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), is fearful for its future existence, and has
been lobbying for itself to be recognized as the "European Security and Defence Assembly."
This would allow it to function within the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
structures within the EU.
171
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), also called the North Atlantic Alliance,
the Atlantic Alliance or the Western Alliance, is an international organization for collective
security established in 1949, in support of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington,
D.C., on 4 April 1949.
The Treaty cautiously avoids reference both to the identification of an enemy and to
any concrete measures of common defense. Nevertheless, it was intended so that if the USSR
and its allies launched an attack against any of the NATO members, it would be treated as if it
was an attack on all member states. This marked a significant change for the United States,
which traditionally harboured strong isolationist groups across parties in Congress. However,
the feared invasion of Western Europe never came. Instead, the provision was invoked for the
first time in the treaty's history on 12 September 2001, in response to the September 11 attacks
on the U.S. the day before.
172
Article 17 of the consolidated version of the TEU, amended by the Treaty of Nice, reads:
1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security
of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might
lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case
recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their
respective constitutional requirements.
The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the
obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible
with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.
The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States
consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.
2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
3. Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall be taken without
prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, second subparagraph.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation
between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western
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Therefore, it would seem

inconsistent not to admit the capacity to conclude international agreements in
order to implement this policy. Most recently, an agreement between the
International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and
assistance, signed on April 10, 2006 and entered into force on May 1, 2006,
proves that certain members of the international community do recognize the
EU legal personality.173

B.2.- Interpretations on the EU's Capacity of External Action

There are interpretations on the EU’s capacity of external action.174 This
capacity is not supported by the preparatory work of the Maastricht Treaty or
subsequent practice. As an example, there is a Memorandum of Understanding
of 1994 between the EU and the Western European Union, on the one hand,
and various ex-Yugoslavia actors, on the other, which set up an EU
administration for the City of Mostar. This Memorandum was prepared within
the context of the second pillar and had to be concluded on behalf of the
“Member States of the European Union acting within the framework of the

European Union (WEU) and NATO, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or
impede that provided for in this title.
5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will
be reviewed in accordance with Article 48.
173
OJ (L 115, pp. 50-57), 28 April 2006.
174
See, in this respect, Klabbers, J. “Presumptive Personality: The European Union in
International Law”, in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European
Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 231-53.
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Union in full association with the European Commission.”175 Here one could
ask whether the cumbersome title of the Mostar Memorandum of
Understanding is conductive to asserting the “identity” of the EU in the
international scene, which, according to Article 2 TEU,176 is one of the
objectives of the Union.
In the post-Maastricht era, the concept of the Union stands out as a
signpost. The general public, as well as third States and international
organizations, may well be under the impression that the EC no longer exists.
It is normally the EU that enters into an engagement when policy documents,
which are not going through the formalities of a treaty, are drawn up. As an
example, we have the comprehensive political arrangement relating to the EU175

See Bury, C & Hetsch, P. “Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune” Rép.
Communautaire Dalloz, October 1996, pp. 1-11, at p. 8.
176
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), reads:
The Union shall set itself the following objectives:
- to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve
balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area without
internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the
establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty,
- to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a
common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence
policy, which might lead to a common defence, in accordance with the provisions of Article
17,
- to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States
through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union,
- to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the
free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to
external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime,
- to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it with a view to considering to
what extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be
revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of
the Community.
The objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty and in accordance
with the conditions and the timetable set out therein while respecting the principle of
subsidiarity as defined in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
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U.S. dispute over U.S. unilateral sanctions policy, i.e., Helms-Burton Act.
This arrangement was concluded at the EU-U.S. Summit in London on May
18, 1998, and refers continuously to the EU as one of the parties.
The package adopted at this Summit includes an “Understanding with
Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection,”177 the
“Transatlantic Partnership on Political Co-operation” and an “Understanding
on Conflicting Requirements.” The negotiations leading up to this package
were based on an EU-U.S. Understanding of 11 April 1997.178 This
Understanding enabled the EU to suspend a case against the U.S. in the
context of the World Trade Organization.179 Also, a Joint Declaration on EUPalestinian Security Co-operation, agreed with the Palestinian Authority on
April 20, 1998, refers to the EU as the other party. In these two examples,
there are concrete commitments of a political, rather than a legally binding
nature (soft law).

V. Concluding Remarks

Although, technically speaking, the EU does not have legal personality in an
explicit manner, the following conclusions can be made:
177

http://www.eurunion.org/partner/summit/Summit9805/invest.htm (last visited June 2,
2006).
178
See the Understanding between the European Union and the United States on U.S.
extraterritorial
legislation
11
April
1997,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/extraterritoriality/understanding_04_97.htm
(last visited June 2, 2006).
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Any interpretation of Article 24 TEU in the sense that agreements
concluded in the framework of this provision are binding on Member
States, but not on the EU, would be in contradiction with the other
provisions of the TEU, and more precisely with its Title V.

•

The fact that, at the Intergovernmental Conference of Amsterdam, certain
Member States were opposed to giving a legal personality to the EU, does
not mean that the Conference did not intend to provide the EU with the
means to conclude international agreements. Hence, one could argue that
there is an implicit EU legal personality through Article 24 TEU.

•

Article 24 TEU should be interpreted in the sense that agreements
concluded by the Council within this provision are concluded by the
Council on behalf of the EU, and they are binding on the EU. This does
not mean that Member States cannot take action themselves to implement
the CFSP. Certainly they can. Nor does it mean that the Council does not
also act on behalf of the Member States. As an example, we have the
imposition of immigration restrictions envisaged by a Council common
position, covered by Title VI of the TEU (provisions on police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters), where individual Member States are free
to take action independently of the rest of EU Member States, or the
Council.

179

For the background to the dispute, see Sterm, B. “Vers la mondialisation juridique? Les
lois Helms-Burton et D’Amato-Kennedy,” Revue Générale de Droit International Public,
1996, pp. 979-1003.
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